La importancia de la cooperación epistémica

El objetivo principal de este trabajo radica en exponer las virtudes de la cooperación epistémica, la cual resulta elemental para atribuir conocimientos legítimamente, tanto en contextos intuitivos como en ámbitos donde se exigen evidencias. En una primera parte se expondrán dos líneas principales por las que se entiende en qué consiste la cooperación epistémica, para luego enfocarse en cómo funciona en contextos de atribuciones intuitivas de conocimiento. Luego, se revisará la cooperación epistémica en contextos exigentes destacando su aspecto social. Por último, se presentarán cuatro objeciones con sus respectivas respuestas.

cooperación epistémica, atribuciones de conocimiento, epistemología social, contextualismo

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